Why the mind has a body
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| Why the mind has a body |
Excerpt from the introduction:
The problem of the relation of mind and body takes, for contemporary thought, the form of interactionism and automatism.
It accordingly asserts in sensation an action by the mind in its dealings with the world of the object of the body on the mind, in volition an action.
The reader will find in this book
a sketch of an explanation of the connection of mind and body
a proposal, based thereon, for an s controversy between parallelism and interactionists.
The explanation of the connection of mind and body is not in substance new.
It is which is implied in the panpsychism of Fechner and Clifford. Brief expositions of it have been given by Paulsen's mind and body
a proposal, based thereon, for as an explanation of the connection of my Brief expositions of it has been given by Paulsen and, more.
A further merit of the explanation that enables us to settle the controversy is that it actionists and the parallelism in a way satisfactory to both parties.
Parallelism is commonly between the entries supposed to deny the efficiency of the mind, and this is a great objection.
The proposals felt to be on that, so far from denying efficiency, parallelism involves and implies it, may even seem to the reader a contradiction in terms.