Elements of constructive philosophy
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| John Stuart Mackenzie |
This book is essential for the student of philosophy, it illustrates modern philosophy terms and schools with criticisms to construct practical philosophy
This book was undertaken more than a quarter of a century ago, and I have had it pretty constantly in mind during the period that has elapsed; but difficulties of various kinds — perhaps not all to be regretted — ^have delayed its production. My primary object in writing has been to clear up my own ideas on several fundamental problems.
On many of them, I still feel a good deal of uncertainty, but I can scarcely hope that that will ever be wholly removed; and the attempt that has here been made may be of some service to others, especially to those who are more nearly at the beginning of their studies.
I have tried to meet the needs of such students by giving a considerable number of references to other books and articles in which particular topics are more fully discussed. In the course of the work, I have sought to take account of all the important contributions that have been made to the subject, from whatever quarter they might proceed; but there may probably be some degree of arbitrariness in my selection both of the problems to be considered and of the writers who live dealt with them. Believing as I do that some of the most fundamental problems are of interest to many who are not specialists in philosophy, I have endeavoured to avoid technicalities, as far as possible, and to give a considerable number 'of simple illustrations; and I have not hesitated, especially in the more speculative parts of the work^ to refer to writers who cannot, in any strict sense, be described as philosophers. If this is an offence against the dignity of the subject, I must crave the indulgence of the more purely scientific reader. It will be observed that my treatment has been a good deal influenced by the writings of those who are commonly referred to as the New Realists.
They have undoubtedly rendered very valuable service in clearing away the last remains of the subjective bias by which modern philosophy, especially in our own country, has been so greatly perverted. It does not appear to me that their main contentions are in any way opposed to such idealism as that of Plato; and I doubt whether they are really opposed to that of Hegel, at least as interpreted by Edward Caird and Dr Bosanquet.
I think it is true, however, that almost all idealists have tended to express their meaning in language that lends itself too readily to a subjective interpretation. It has been one of my chief aims to guard against this tendency in my own statements, but it is very possible that I may not have wholly succeeded. It has always seemed to me to be very difficult to deal satisfactorily with any special problems in philosophy without considering their bearings upon all the others; and I have thus been forced, somewhat against my inclination, to attempt a survey of the subject as a whole.
The problems to which I have given most attention are those that bear upon ethical conceptions and those that are connected with the subject of infinity, especially in its application to time. The general problem of time seems to me to be the most difficult in the whole range of philosophy, and I can hardly expect that my method of dealing with it will commend itself to many minds, but I trust it may at least help to stimulate others to more successful efforts.
It is only by the co-operative thought of many that we may hope to reach the truth. The earlier parts of the book are introductory to the main subjects and are somewhat more lightly handled. I have felt it to be necessary to deal, to some extent, with the fundamental conceptions of logic; chiefly because they seem to me to have been a little obscured by a too psychological method of treatment. This applies, I think, even to the very careful and thorough work of Dr Bosanquet, as well as to the thoughtful studies of Professor Dewey and his disciples. I have endeavoured to indicate how the treatment of these conceptions is affected by a more realistic method of study. In connection with this I have laid special emphasis on the conception of the objective order, which appears to me to be of the greatest importance. But my exposition of this, as well as of some other aspects of the subject, is necessary of a somewhat sketchy character. It could only be fully dealt with in a; treatise specially devoted to logic. Because of the close approximation that is made by some recent philosophers in this country to the leading conceptions of Oriental speculation, I have thought it desirable to take some account of the relations between these different modes of thought. In doing this I have been greatly helped by several interesting communications that I have received from V. Subramanza Iyer, of Bangalore. I take this opportunity of expressing to him my most hearty thanks.
Some contents of the book
INTRODUCTION
WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? . . . . . .11
I. General Definition. — 2. Relations of Philosophy to Poetry and
Religion. — 3. Relations of Philosophy to the Special Sciences. —
4. Relations to Psychology. — 5. Relations to Logic. — 6. Relations to Ethics. — 7. Relations to Metaphysics. — 8. General Aims of Philo-
sophy.
Religion. — 3. Relations of Philosophy to the Special Sciences. —
4. Relations to Psychology. — 5. Relations to Logic. — 6. Relations to Ethics. — 7. Relations to Metaphysics. — 8. General Aims of Philo-
sophy.
BOOK I
GENERAL PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE— FROM DOUBT TO BELIEF
CHAPTER I
HOW TO BEGIN ....... 27
I. Difficulty in making a Beginning. — 2. Doubt a« a Starting-point.
— De omnibus dubitandum est. — 3. Consciousness as the First Certainty. — 4. The Problem of Judgment. — 5. Value of the Method of Descartes.
— De omnibus dubitandum est. — 3. Consciousness as the First Certainty. — 4. The Problem of Judgment. — 5. Value of the Method of Descartes.
CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM OF BELIEF .... -34
I. General Statement of the Problem. — 2. Belief as Force of Conviction. — 3. Belief and Action. — 4. Belief and Apprehension. —5. Brentano's View of Belief. — 6. Belief and Judgment. — 7. Subjective and Objective Aspects of Belief.
CHAPTER III
THE GENERAL NATURE OF CHOICE . . . -48
I. The Meaning of Choice. — 2. Choice and Attention. — 3. Interest. —
4. Valuation. — 5. Choice and Belief.
4. Valuation. — 5. Choice and Belief.
CHAPTER IV
THE PRIMARY IMPLICATIONS OF BELIEF . . . 56
I. The General Problem. — 2. Existence of Independent Centres of
Consciousness. — 3. Cognition. — 4. Subject and Object. — 5. Subjective Order. — 6. The Fact of Judgment. — 7. Meanings. — 8. Categories. — 9. Valuation. — 10. Laws of Thought. — 11. Implication. — 12. Objective Order. — 13. Truth and Reality. — 14. Transition to Following Chapters.
Consciousness. — 3. Cognition. — 4. Subject and Object. — 5. Subjective Order. — 6. The Fact of Judgment. — 7. Meanings. — 8. Categories. — 9. Valuation. — 10. Laws of Thought. — 11. Implication. — 12. Objective Order. — 13. Truth and Reality. — 14. Transition to Following Chapters.
CHAPTER V
THE IMPORT OF JUDGMENT . . . . .64
I. General Statement of the Problem. — 2. The Meaning of Thought. —
3. Universals. — 4. Concepts and Judgments. — 5. Relation between
Language and Thought. — 6. Explicit and Implicit Meaning. — 7. Types of Judgment. — 8. The Modality of Judgments. — 9. Judgment and Inference. — 10. Objective Order implied in Thought.
3. Universals. — 4. Concepts and Judgments. — 5. Relation between
Language and Thought. — 6. Explicit and Implicit Meaning. — 7. Types of Judgment. — 8. The Modality of Judgments. — 9. Judgment and Inference. — 10. Objective Order implied in Thought.
CHAPTER VI
LAWS OF THOUGHT . . . . . . 80
I. Meaning of Laws of Thought. — 2. Implications of Conception. —
3. Implications of Judgment.— 4. Implications of Inference. — 5. Implications of Belief. — 6. Axioms. — 7. Postulates. — 8. Intuitive Belief. —9. Foundations of Logic.
CHAPTER VII
THE CONCEPTION OF OBJECTIVE ORDER . . . . I06
I. The Meaning of Order. — 2. Modes of Order : (i) Numerical Order ;
(2) Temporal order ; (3) Spatial Order ; (4) Order of Degrees ;
(5) Qualitative Order ; (6) Order of Kinds ; (7) Causal Order ; (8) Order of Growth ; (9) Order of Consciousness ; (10) Order of Value ;
(11) Moral Order ; (12) Logical Order. — 3. Relations within Orders. —4. Relations between Orders.— 5. Implications of Orders. — 6. The conception of a Cosmos. — 7. The Conception of Chaos. — 8. The Order of Experience or Existence.
(2) Temporal order ; (3) Spatial Order ; (4) Order of Degrees ;
(5) Qualitative Order ; (6) Order of Kinds ; (7) Causal Order ; (8) Order of Growth ; (9) Order of Consciousness ; (10) Order of Value ;
(11) Moral Order ; (12) Logical Order. — 3. Relations within Orders. —4. Relations between Orders.— 5. Implications of Orders. — 6. The conception of a Cosmos. — 7. The Conception of Chaos. — 8. The Order of Experience or Existence.
CHAPTER VIII
TRUTH AND REALITY . . . . . . II6
I. The Meaning of Truth and Falsehood. — 1. The Meaning of Correct-
ness and Error. — 3. Truth as Correspondence. — 4. Degrees of Truth.
— 5, Truth as Coherence. — 6. The Meaning of Reality : (i) Reality as Truth ; (2) Reality is Existence ; (3) Reality is Perfection ; (4) Reality as the Absolute or Eternal. — 7. Possibility, Probability, and Necessity.— 8. Non-being. — 9. Degrees of Reality.
ness and Error. — 3. Truth as Correspondence. — 4. Degrees of Truth.
— 5, Truth as Coherence. — 6. The Meaning of Reality : (i) Reality as Truth ; (2) Reality is Existence ; (3) Reality is Perfection ; (4) Reality as the Absolute or Eternal. — 7. Possibility, Probability, and Necessity.— 8. Non-being. — 9. Degrees of Reality.
CHAPTER IX
THE GENERAL NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE .... I28
I. The Meaning of Knowledge. — 2. Explicit and Implicit Knowledge.
— 3. Individual and General Knowledge. — ^4. Intuitive Elements in
Knowledge. — 5. Elements of Intellectual Construction. — 6. Elements of Faith. — 7. General Structure of the World as Known. — 8. Limits of Reasonable Doubt. — 9. Absolute Knowledge and Knowledge of the Absolute. — 10. Idealism and Realism. — 11. Pluralism and Cosmism.
— 3. Individual and General Knowledge. — ^4. Intuitive Elements in
Knowledge. — 5. Elements of Intellectual Construction. — 6. Elements of Faith. — 7. General Structure of the World as Known. — 8. Limits of Reasonable Doubt. — 9. Absolute Knowledge and Knowledge of the Absolute. — 10. Idealism and Realism. — 11. Pluralism and Cosmism.
CHAPTER X
THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE ..... I44
THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE ..... I44
I. Introductory Remarks. — 2. The Doctrine of Representative Ideas. —
3. The Cartesian Dualism. — 4. Objective Idealism. — 5. The Attitude of Locke. — 6. Subjective Idealism. — 7. The Scepticism of Hume. — 8. Dualistic Realism. — 9. The Critical Philosophy. — lo. Agnosticism. — II. Pragmatism. — 12. Intuitional Idealism. — 13. The New Realism.
— 14. Absolute Idealism or Cosmism. — 15. General Summary.
3. The Cartesian Dualism. — 4. Objective Idealism. — 5. The Attitude of Locke. — 6. Subjective Idealism. — 7. The Scepticism of Hume. — 8. Dualistic Realism. — 9. The Critical Philosophy. — lo. Agnosticism. — II. Pragmatism. — 12. Intuitional Idealism. — 13. The New Realism.
— 14. Absolute Idealism or Cosmism. — 15. General Summary.
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